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NEW YORK CITY POLICE DEPARTMENT  
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**PREPARED STATEMENT OF TESTIMONY  
BEFORE THE  
UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES  
COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS, CYBERSECURITY, AND SCIENCE  
AND TECHNOLOGY**

**STATUS REPORT ON FEDERAL AND LOCAL EFFORTS TO SECURE  
RADIOLOGICAL SOURCES**

**SEPTEMBER 14, 2009**

Good morning Chair Clarke, Ranking Member Lungren, and members of the House Committee on Homeland Security's Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology. My name is Captain Michael Riggio, and I am the Commanding Officer of the NYPD Counterterrorism Bureau's Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Section. On behalf of Dr. Richard Falkenrath, the New York City Police Department's Deputy Commissioner of Counterterrorism, I am grateful for this opportunity to address you.

The NYPD is proactively engaged in a multi-faceted approach to protecting the City from terrorism, including radiological and nuclear terrorism. The NYPD has dedicated a variety of resources to combating the threat posed by radiological sources and radiological and nuclear weapons, including: personnel, technology, equipment, and training. We are particularly concerned with two threats: radiological dispersal devices (RDD), such as "dirty bombs", and improvised nuclear devices (IND).

Background and Beginnings

The NYPD's Counterterrorism Division began conducting radiological source security assessments in 2003. Those efforts quickly progressed as the City prepared for the Republican National Convention in the summer of 2004. The NYPD, in partnership with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, the Department of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), conducted

security vulnerability assessments of several facilities that contained high-consequence radioactive sources. These assessments revealed that large amounts of materials were stored in New York City hospitals and medical research facilities. Most of these sources were in moderately secure locations and were used for medical therapy (e.g., oncology, x-rays, and sterilization of blood supplies, etc.). As a result of these assessments, recommendations were made to enhance the security posture of each facility.

After the Republican National Convention, and as a result of the NRC's Increased Controls (IC) imposed on Agreement States in 2005, the Counterterrorism Division began working with many of the City's medical and industrial facilities that have radiological sources that meet the IC's quantity threshold. Today, the Counterterrorism Division, as a stand-alone unit and in partnership with the New York City Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, conducts site surveys and provides security recommendations to almost 100 facilities within the City of New York. These security recommendations include, among other things: limiting access to rooms that contain equipment with radiological sources by requiring a personal code or key card; and monitoring access with CCTV cameras and other access-tracking technology.

### Securing the Cities

In the summer of 2006, the NYPD began working with the Department of Homeland Security's Domestic Nuclear Detection Office (DNDO) on a multi-state regional partnership called Securing the Cities. The goal of the Securing the Cities program is to create a layered architectural framework, or foundation, in and around the City of New York to detect and interdict an RDD, an IND, or the radiological materials needed to assemble such devices. The NYPD has 12 principle partners in this effort, representing over 150 agencies, in three states – New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut.

The Securing the Cities partners realize that while New York City remains a top target for terrorist groups, planning, pre-operational surveillance, and bomb-making may occur outside of the City, in partner jurisdictions.

For this reason, the New York Area Securing the Cities program has greatly enhanced the detection and interdiction capabilities of the States of New York, New Jersey, and Connecticut, providing local law enforcement agencies with thousands of pieces of radiological detection and interdiction equipment. This equipment is deployed daily by personnel in the tri-state area.

To do its part, the NYPD deploys over 1,000 radiological detection and interdiction assets on a daily basis. These assets are deployed by patrol officers performing routine duties, specialized duties, and those on assignment at strategic locations. We use checkpoints, chokepoints, mobile detection systems, and handheld detection.

Within the Securing the Cities program, there are six subcommittees that help run day-to-day operations, each of which oversees an important aspect of the radiological interdiction mission. The “Source Security Subcommittee” is specifically dedicated to ensuring that facilities that use or store radiological materials within the New York region are visited and surveyed. The goal is to ensure that source security is conducted regionally, and that a consistent security posture exists within the region for all locations where radiological sources of concern are located. This subcommittee is also preparing a best-practices document to ensure that consistent and easily identified standards are instituted and practiced within the region.

### Source Movement

Additionally, the NYPD ensures that a high level of security is maintained during the movement of sources of concern. The NYPD’s Operations Division is notified any time a radiological source is being transported into or through New York City. The Operations Division coordinates the Department’s response and patrol deployments during these transports. This may include vehicle escorts and uniformed and plainclothes on-scene security.

### Counterterrorism Strategic Deployments

The NYPD conducts several counterterrorism deployments on a daily basis. They include: Critical Response Vehicle (CRV) surges; Operation Hercules; Operation Transit Operational Response Canine Heavy Weapons (TORCH); and Radiological Chokepoints.

A CRV deployment consists of over 75 marked police cars on a single tour of duty that deploy to sensitive locations based on daily intelligence. This deployment is highly flexible so that personnel can be redeployed during operations as events unfold locally and globally. The supervisors who oversee these deployments are all equipped with personal radiation detection devices.

Operation Hercules deploys Emergency Services Unit (ESU) officers with heavy weapons and tactical gear, canine officers, highway patrol officers, and detectives from the NYPD Intelligence Division, to sensitive locations throughout the City on a daily basis. Similarly, Operation TORCH deploys ESU officers with heavy weapons and tactical gear, canine officers, and a counterterrorism liaison officer, to the City’s critical transportation hubs. Each of the ESU officers involved in these deployments is equipped with a personal radiation detector, and some are trained to use advanced radiation detection equipment.

Finally, radiological chokepoints are set up to interdict radiological sources at several locations throughout the City each day. At these chokepoints, uniformed personnel operate advanced detection vehicles and equipment. They also scan each

vehicle that passes through a single lane of traffic at approximately five miles per hour. At all of these deployments, all alarms are investigated and resolved.

### Recently Discovered Vulnerability

Recently, an industrial radiograph, which possessed a radioactive source, was reported missing from an industrial radiography company located in one of the City's five boroughs. This type of device is used to inspect metals and light alloys for structural defects. Members of the NYPD and the FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Force conducted an investigation into the missing device. The device was ultimately returned to the company. In the course of interviews conducted during the investigation, it was claimed that some employees in this industry remove these devices after hours.

While the NYPD cannot confirm how widespread this practice is, it should be noted that the insider threat presents a security risk to the industry. The NYPD is currently working with the New York State Department of Health to investigate this incident and to develop strategies that will help prevent this from happening again.

### Conclusion

Finally, the New York City Police Department supports any efforts to increase and toughen the NRC's regulations and oversight authority to ensure that every facility in the United States that handles radioactive sources is as tightly monitored and secure as those in New York City. While we never stop working to prevent an attack within New York City, we have no ability to prevent the theft of dangerous radiological and nuclear materials at facilities and locations that are outside of our jurisdiction. We hope that the NYPD's efforts to secure radiological sources will serve as a model for other cities..

Members of the Committee on Homeland Security and the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats, Cybersecurity, and Science and Technology, I thank you for your time this morning and I look forward to working with you to protect our country from radiological and nuclear threats. Thank you.